HAL’s Tejas delays expose cracks in India’s fighter jet programme

The public criticism by Air Chief Marshal AP Singh of Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd (HAL) over delays in delivering the Tejas Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) Mk1A underscores critical inefficiencies in India's indigenous fighter jet programme.

The delays not only raise concerns about the credibility of HAL but also highlight systemic issues within India's defence procurement and manufacturing processes.

As China advances in military aviation with its sixth-generation stealth fighter, India’s struggle with timely aircraft production and quality assurance exposes its vulnerabilities in maintaining aerial superiority.

Watch | What makes the new Tejas fighter jet different from its predecessor?

Organisational deficiencies

One of the most striking issues raised by the IAF chief is the discrepancy between HAL’s promises and actual production progress.

Despite assurances of delivering 11 Tejas Mk1A aircraft by early 2025, none were ready during inspection. The lack of tangible progress suggests an overestimation of HAL’s production capabilities or an institutional reluctance to acknowledge delays early in the process.

Additionally, the claim that the aircraft at Aero India 2025 were mislabelled as Mk1A despite lacking the requisite weapons and capabilities further erodes confidence in HAL’s accountability and transparency.

Poor history

Moreover, HAL’s delays are not new. The IAF has yet to receive the first 40 Tejas fighters despite deliveries officially slated to begin in 2016. This sluggish progress raises concerns about the long-term sustainability of India's indigenous fighter jet programmes.

The delays not only impact the immediate availability of fighter jets but also reduce the credibility of HAL in future defence contracts.

The scepticism of foreign defence manufacturers, such as Dassault Aviation’s reluctance to partner with HAL for Rafale production, further supports the argument that HAL’s inefficiencies are well known within the global defence industry.

What HAL says

In his defence, HAL Chairman and Managing Director DK Sunil has said that because of the sanctions after India’s nuclear test in 1998, HAL has had to build things from the ground up. He said he was confident about delivering at least 11 Tejas-Mk1A aircraft to IAF by March-end.

However, a former army official told The Federal HALs should look beyond fixing technical defects. “It is more about restoring credibility to be taken seriously by international players,” he said.

Some former defence officials The Federal spoke to said several structural and operational deficiencies within HAL have contributed to delays and poor-quality output in its projects.

Bureaucracy and streamlining: HAL’s bureaucratic structure hampers efficiency and slows down decision-making. Streamlining its processes to focus on results rather than procedural red tape is essential for meeting deadlines.

Quality control and production issues: There have been persistent concerns about HAL’s quality control. A rush to meet production targets, especially towards the end of the financial year, often results in compromised quality. Poor manufacturing and maintenance have led to several accidents and aircraft failures, raising serious concerns about the reliability of HAL’s output.

Vendor management: Delays in vendor approvals, unjustified material rejections and a lack of transparency in material acceptance slow the production process and reduce overall accountability.

Reliance on foreign suppliers: HAL’s dependence on foreign suppliers for critical components, particularly aircraft engines, makes the organisation vulnerable to supply chain disruptions. For instance, delays in securing the GE F404 engines have directly impacted Tejas' production timelines.

Lack of private sector engagement: Greater engagement with private industry could alleviate some of the delays in aircraft production.

Management structure issues: The practice of deploying IAF officers to HAL for oversight has not been executed effectively. Structural reforms are needed to ensure that IAF involvement enhances operational efficiency rather than becoming another layer of bureaucratic oversight.

Work culture and accountability: A significant issue within HAL is its unionised workforce's sluggish and often complacent attitude. A lack of accountability for production delays, errors and technical failures has contributed to a slow and inefficient work culture. Without more substantial performance incentives and accountability measures, HAL will struggle to meet deadlines.

Past failures in aircraft development: HAL’s track record is marred by unsuccessful and abandoned aircraft projects. A series of failed attempts, including flawed overhauls of existing aircraft, has demonstrated that HAL has yet to acquire sufficient aircraft and engine design expertise. Some of these failures have led to accidents and fatalities, diminishing confidence in the organisation’s capabilities.

India and China

The delays in Tejas production directly threaten India’s air combat capabilities, especially in the context of China’s rapid advancements. The unveiling of China’s sixth-generation stealth fighter, likely part of the J-36 programme, highlights the widening technological gap between the two nations.

India’s inability to meet its production deadlines hampers its ability to maintain a credible deterrence posture.

Additionally, the IAF’s fleet serviceability rates remain below optimal levels, with the Su-30MKI operating at only 55 per cent efficiency, compared to the required minimum of 70 per cent. Combined with the slow induction of newer aircraft, this further weakens India’s aerial combat readiness.

Financial constraints

The financial strain on India’s defence sector adds another complexity to the problem. The defence budget for 2025-26 stands at Rs 6,81,210 crore, with nearly 50 per cent allocated to salaries and pensions. This leaves limited funds for capital expenditures on new aircraft production and modernisation.

Furthermore, since most defence purchases are transacted in US dollars, the rupee’s 4 per cent depreciation over the past year has increased procurement costs, exacerbating financial pressures. If this trend continues, India may face additional delays in acquiring critical components for aircraft production.

The persistent delays and quality issues in India’s Indigenous fighter jet program reflect deeper structural inefficiencies within HAL and the broader defence manufacturing ecosystem.