What India, and the world, can learn from AI-171 Dreamliner crash report

The Air India flight 171 crash calls for a slew of reforms in the aviation sector – from a thorough review of an aircraft’s electrical system to a detailed probe into even the smallest of anomalies, to the separation of flight-critical and non-critical systems backed by triple redundancies to avoid total power loss.

The crash represents a complex aviation disaster centred around the unprecedented simultaneous movement of fuel control switches to the switch-off position from ‘run’ (starting the fuel supply), during takeoff.

The Aircraft Accident Investigation Bureau's (AAIB) preliminary report reveals that both engines lost power within seconds of takeoff due to fuel control switches being moved to the ‘cutoff’ position.

A detailed perusal of the report and talking to experts shed light on the critical issues in the global aviation safety framework that scream for reform and review at the speed of light.

What happened? An expert's view

“The fuel control switches (or engine start switches as they are known) are installed on the control stand in the flight deck and used by the pilot to supply or cut off fuel to the engines. These switches are manually operated and require deliberate action by the cockpit crew to physically move them between the two modes, namely ‘cutoff’ and ‘run’,” Umesh Raja, an aviation expert who has held key positions in international air cargo and IT multinationals, told The Federal.

Also read | Air India crash report: ‘No pilot would do that,’ say experts

For fuel-control switches to be shifted from ‘run’ to ‘cutoff’, each has to be first lifted manually and then moved down. They have spring loaded mechanism and are surrounded by a mechanical gate for safety reasons, representing a locking feature. Since each engine has a dedicated fuel switch, the action must be repeated twice to cut off the fuel supply to both engines.

Complicated situation

“Both moved to the shut-off position within a gap of one second, which is highly unlikely. It's quite a complicated situation to analyse,” Raja said.

The expert’s analysis underscores the unprecedented nature of the Air India flight AI-171 disaster, where regulatory oversight failures combined with technical anomalies created what he describes as a situation beyond current technological and human capabilities to predict or prevent.

He pointed out that the technical impossibility of what occurred defies every principle of aircraft design and safety engineering — two independent fuel control switches, each protected by multiple safety mechanisms, simultaneously cutting off fuel to both engines just as the Boeing 787 Dreamliner climbed away from Ahmedabad airport.

“These happen beyond the control of technology and human capabilities. It is a rarest or rare case,” Raja said. The fuel control switches, which he likens to “electrical switch buttons” with advanced locking features, are designed to prevent exactly what occurred—inadvertent operation that could starve engines of fuel.

Raja pointed to a critical 2018 Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) warning about these very switches, which requested inspection by carriers and operators based on reports from operational Boeing 737s.

The advisory noted that some installations of these switch modules had occurred with the locking feature disabled, and if confirmed, carriers and operators were advised to replace them at the next opportunity.

Not the first instance

According to reports, a similar incident happened in the case of a Delta Airline in 1980. The airline captain accidentally pulled both fuel cutoff knobs after takeoff, stalling the engines but restarting them at 1,600 ft and landing safely.

The FAA responded with a mandatory guard over 767 fuel switches. Air India flight AI-171 faced the same failure at a far lower altitude, with no such guard installed.

Also read | Ahmedabad Air India plane crash report highlights: 10 things AAIB said

The expert’s analysis underscores the unprecedented nature of the Air India flight AI-171 disaster, where regulatory oversight failures combined with technical anomalies created what he describes as a situation beyond current technological and human capabilities to predict or prevent.

The FAA directive was simple and to the point from the US authority – “While the aeroplane is on the ground, check whether the fuel control switch can be moved between the two positions without lifting up the switch. If the switch can be moved without lifting it up, the locking feature has been disengaged, and the switch should be replaced at the earliest opportunity.” However, it explicitly also said that it is “not an unsafe condition concerning airworthiness.”

Cascading catastrophe

The technical catastrophe that followed was as devastating as it was predictable. “Both engines flamed out due to fuel starvation, leading to no thrust availability, resulting in the subsequent deployment of RAT (RAM Air Turbine). That means there was a total loss of power, including backup power resources like auxiliary power unit (APU) becoming inoperative or unsupportive in that situation, for sure,” Raja explains.

The current system, which allows national aviation authorities to choose whether to implement safety recommendations from other jurisdictions independently, creates dangerous gaps in global safety standards.

The Boeing 787’s advanced “more-electric” architecture, often praised as a technological marvel, became a critical vulnerability during the Air India crash, as both engines failed simultaneously.

The pilots’ confusion, captured on cockpit voice recordings, tells the human story within the technical disaster. One did ask the other, “Why did you cut off fuel?” The other replied, “I didn’t do so.” This shows they were caught unawares and went all out to salvage the situation.

Watch | Air India Ahmedabad AI-171 crash: Was it Boeing, not the pilots?

Time was the enemy

“They took immediate action, they pushed the switch to the ‘run’ position, which resulted in the relighting of the engines, followed by ignition, fuel flow and gradually thrust recovery; but only one of the engines was able to get activated. The other couldn’t get through the process, as seen in the report. It is something like a reset,” Raja recounted.

“But at just 500 feet above ground level, time was the enemy: It is practically not feasible to gain that sort of thrust and to climb further by putting the fuel switch back in ‘run’ position. Even more critically, the landing gear remained extended during the aircraft’s climb. Retracting the gear is essential to reduce drag and ease the strain on the engine thrust during takeoff. But in this case, the gear was never pulled up, making it even harder for the aircraft to gain altitude. Every possible factor compounded the emergency, resulting in a situation that was, in every sense, beyond the reach of both technology and human intervention," he added.

Reforms and review

The Air India crash brings out fundamental needs in the global aviation safety framework that demand immediate reform and review.

Raja emphasised there must be a thorough review of the aircraft’s electrical systems, particularly how faults are isolated and how power is prioritised during emergencies. Second, airlines should be encouraged to report and investigate even the smallest anomalies; what may seem minor could be the aircraft signalling deeper issues. Third, regulators need to rethink how these scenarios can be simulated and prepare for cascading failures, such as dual engine shutdowns, to ensure real-world readiness.

Also read | 6 reasons why India’s probe on Ahmedabad AI-171 crash is raising global alarm

The expert also pointed out that the airlines should consider architectural ‘de-clustering’—completely separating flight-critical and non-critical systems at the power level, supported by triple redundancies wherever possible.

Equally important is a two-pronged redesign approach: upgrading the Variable Frequency Starter Generators (VFSGs) to hybrid systems with backup power inputs, such as fuel cells or battery-boosted drives, and introducing a fifth standalone generator. This generator should be entirely independent of both engines and act as an emergency power source in the event of a total electrical failure.

Risk reduction

While implementing such changes is technically demanding, these innovations could significantly reduce the risk of a complete electrical blackout in flight.

There should also be mandatory implementation of safety-critical advisories. All safety bulletins addressing potential catastrophic failure modes must be classified as required, with specific timelines for compliance and suitable penalties for non-compliance.

The current system, which allows national aviation authorities to choose whether to implement safety recommendations from other jurisdictions independently, creates dangerous gaps in global safety standards.