Nepal’s political turmoil: Expert Pramod Jaiswal explains the whys and hows

The Federal spoke to Dr Pramod Jaiswal, Research Director at NIICE (Nepal Institute for International Cooperation and Engagement), who has taught at universities in Nepal and China and is a senior fellow with leading global institutes. He explains how Nepal’s youth-led protests erupted, why corruption and state overreach became flashpoints, and how Kathmandu balances India and China while looking to regional groupings like BIMSTEC.

How did this conflict begin, and what were the core triggers in your view?

It began with students launching a “Nepo Kids” campaign that contrasted the luxurious lifestyles of political elites’ children—studying abroad, travelling, driving expensive cars—with ordinary Nepalis struggling for basics. Those videos circulated widely. The government then banned social media, which further enraged students.

They organised protests around two demands: lift the social media ban and fight corruption. On September 8, demonstrators gathered and state forces fired, leaving about 19 people dead. That tragedy triggered nationwide protests in places like Pokhara, Biratnagar, Sunsari and elsewhere. A strict curfew followed.

New demands emerged: sack the home minister and secure the prime minister’s resignation. The social media ban was lifted and the home minister removed, but the prime minister initially refused to resign. By the next morning, criminal elements infiltrated the agitation—burning homes of senior leaders, parliament, the presidential and prime ministerial residences, and ministries. The situation turned ugly, the prime minister resigned, and the Nepal Army moved leaders to safe locations. That is how events spiralled over two days.

Some argue that foreign funding or “vested interests” catalysed youth groups, as seen in other countries. Do you see an external hand here?

These movements in Colombo, Bangladesh and now Nepal were youth-led and appeared spontaneous. Accusations exist—against the West for allegedly backing NGOs, against the US responding to China’s growing footprint in Bangladesh and Nepal, even claims of Russian angles in Bangladesh—but the fundamental issue is corruption.

In Bangladesh, a quota issue lit the spark; in Sri Lanka and Nepal, anger at corruption and governance failures was central. Youth frustration is high across South Asia: limited opportunities versus elite excess. States then used heavy-handed tactics—Bangladesh mobilised security forces; in Nepal, 19 were killed in aday, many teenagers in school uniforms. It was devastating.

Instead of addressing causes—like reopening social media or opening talks—the state escalated. Comparisons to Tiananmen are often made to convey the shock people felt. The silence of political parties and the international community after the student deaths deepened public anger. By focusing on “who benefits” or social media debates, many ignored the core problem: broken delivery and corruption.

How would you describe Nepal’s balancing act between India and China? Has Kathmandu been successful, and is dependency on India still far greater?

India–Nepal ties are unique: open borders on three sides; cross-border marriages; pegged currency; roughly 80% of trade with India; reciprocal honorary army chief ties; millions of Nepalis working in India, and Indians in Nepal. India built 22 of Nepal’s 44 airports. The relationship is civilisational—Pashupatinath, Kashi, festivals, language and food.

China is a “new” practical neighbour in connectivity terms due to the Himalayas. Engagement is largely economic, with Beijing expanding its footprint as its power grows. But you cannot compare India and China in Nepal: culture, language, political systems and geography are entirely different.

Anti-India sentiment exists but is often anti-policy rather than anti-India—open borders mean Indian domestic moves (like demonetisation or GST) ripple into Nepal. There are also class issues: Nepali workers’ experiences in India mirror how India treats that class generally. Both sides have made mistakes and must work on sensitivities.

Will China’s approach in Nepal remain economic, or could it turn security-driven? What are the risks of “occupation” versus economic strategy?

Traditionally, Nepal–China ties were economic, with Beijing following non-intervention. Under Xi Jinping, China is more assertive regionally, influenced by India–China tensions and concerns over Tibet and Taiwan. Beijing seeks deeper political and security links in South Asia.

Nepal is cautious. It will not allow its soil to be used against India, and likewise does not want Indian activities that irritate China. Kathmandu signed the Belt and Road Initiative in 2017, but has not approved a single BRI project—precisely to manage partners’ sensitivities. Nepal aims to engage China economically while keeping a strategic distance due to its delicate geography and politics.

Given deep trade with India, how do you see soft power and public perceptions playing out? Can China capitalise on worker grievances?

Nepalis largely work in India, not China; there is no comparable labour channel to China. Soft power is overwhelmingly Indian: Bollywood, shared religion and festivals, cuisine, temples, and family ties. With China, language, food, politics—everything is different, and there’s the Himalayan barrier.

Yes, some Nepalis return from India with grievances, often class-related. Anti-India feeling exists, but it’s typically about specific policies, not a Pakistan- or Bangladesh-style hostility. Proximity creates friction, but it is within a family-like relationship where both sides must manage issues.

What role can SAARC and BIMSTEC play now, and where will Nepal invest its diplomatic energy?

Nepal values SAARC—it hosts the Secretariat; Bangladesh cherishes SAARC’s origins. But India–Pakistan tensions and terrorism concerns have paralysed it, and Nepal cannot revive SAARC on its own.

BIMSTEC offers a real opportunity. Without Pakistan and Afghanistan, it connects Nepal to the Indian Ocean and the Indo-Pacific economy. Nepal sees prospects in connectivity, trade, tourism (especially Buddhist circuits), and sub-regional groupings like BBIN (Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Nepal). Kathmandu is fully committed to BIMSTEC and sees it as the practical path for regionalism and growth.

What unique aspects of this crisis are overlooked—and how do ports and connectivity shape Nepal’s future?

Nepal lies between two giants but borders their poorest regions: Bihar and parts of West Bengal to the south, and Tibet to the north. We don’t border Kolkata, Delhi, Shanghai or Beijing. To benefit, we must break the insulation through connectivity.

Kolkata port is the nearest and most feasible; there are options like Visakhapatnam or other Indian ports, but distance and practicalities matter. Bangladesh’s ports could be complementary. China has offered port access, but without rail/road across the Himalayas, it’s not feasible in the next 10–20 years. Even if future rail tunnels materialise, India will remain Nepal’s primary route due to culture, climate, politics and geography. Nepal cannot “balance” India and China equally when it is open to India on three sides; India’s weight will always be greater.

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