
Hasina verdict | Govt's PR exercise to malign Awami League: Ex-minister Chowdhury
In an exclusive conversation, Mohibul Hasan Chowdhury analyses Sheikh Hasina’s death sentence, the legal process behind it, and what it means for Bangladesh’s political future
Bangladesh has entered one of its most turbulent phases in decades. With former Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina sentenced to death in absentia and the Awami League barred from elections, the country faces a political vacuum, intense polarisation, and a volatile interim regime accused of overreach.
Also read: Bangladesh on the edge: Why fragmentation looms and what it means for India
In this exclusive conversation, former education minister Mohibul Hasan Chowdhury lays out why he believes the verdict is unlawful, how the student protests spiralled into regime change, and what the crisis means for India–Bangladesh ties.
Were you anticipating a death sentence for Sheikh Hasina? How are you responding politically and legally?
First of all, we responded to the legal anomalies of this conviction. The interim government had no legal mandate to amend the original law passed by Parliament. In the absence of a sitting Parliament, they made illegal changes to the law solely to try us and our leaders. The entire procedure is flawed. The judge of the tribunal was absent for the last month and was apparently watching hearings from home.
We knew what was coming. Their objective is to remove the top Awami League leadership and destroy the party’s political infrastructure. They began this as soon as they took over on August 8 last year, but they have failed. Because the purge was so deep — from grassroots to top — an organic unity has formed among party workers and with the people of Bangladesh, who are fed up with the current government.
We are confident that when we declare political programmes, people will voluntarily participate and this regime will face its natural end. There is no avenue open to us — this tribunal is illegal, we have not been given the right to represent ourselves, and there is no way to appeal this sentence. They know this verdict is not implementable; it is merely a PR exercise to malign us.
They may stage another drama by appointing a so-called state attorney to file an appeal in absentia, continuing this farce. But we will launch our protest movement.
Also read: Hasina’s death sentence pushes Bangladesh to brink of civil war
Is this the biggest crisis the Awami League has faced since independence?
Since independence, certainly not. In 1975, the entire family of Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman was assassinated except Sheikh Hasina and Sheikh Rehana, who were abroad. Many party leaders were killed. From August 15, 1975, to 1979, there was unlimited persecution. The party was banned, and the country was under military dictatorships.
Awami League survived because it is intertwined with Bangladesh’s history. The socio-cultural fabric of Bangladesh accommodates Awami League more than any other party. The defeated forces of 1971 have repeatedly returned — sometimes through military intervention, sometimes through street riots — and they continue doing what they did in the past.
We also survived 2001-2006, when the BNP–Jamaat-e-Islami government ran brutal campaigns against us and we lost nearly 3,000 activists. Awami League is not just a political party; it represents the concentrated feelings of liberal, secular, progressive activists — most of whom have lost family members to brutal regimes.
Every setback costs Awami League blood. In my own family, my mother died in a bomb explosion when I was four. I survived by seconds. My father, a veteran politician, was jailed for years without trial. We have endured brutality repeatedly and we always rise from the ashes.
Also read: 'Biased, rigged tribunal,’ says Sheikh Hasina as she rejects charges against her
Looking back at the student agitation that preceded Sheikh Hasina’s ouster, do you think the government could have acted differently?
What we did not anticipate was the agenda behind the protest. From the beginning, we were lenient. Students had been blocking Dhaka’s streets since July 1. Police were even facilitating protests at different points across the country.
As protests turned violent, many suggested we immediately announce acceptance of all student demands. We told them the case was pending in the High Court; we could not intervene while it was before the Supreme Court. Still, we promised their demands would be met.
But the agenda was different — blood, riots, destruction. When things spiralled out of control, police were unprepared for the brutal attacks on them. Stations were burned; officers were lynched. They had no choice but to defend themselves. When violence escalated further, we had to call in the Army.
The entire focus of the rioters was on Dhaka city. Previously, protests happened nationwide, but the fall of Dhaka was never attempted. This time, the plan was different. Until early August, protest leaders kept telling the media they had nothing against the government — while actively instigating violence.
After taking over, they have openly confessed that they lied and that it was part of a meticulous design. They now admit they planned to kill policemen and escalate to urban guerrilla warfare if needed. Every part of this was a well-designed regime change operation.
They had powerful foreign support. Dr. Muhammad Yunus himself claimed foreign assistance. He is immensely wealthy — not just through Grameen Bank but as the 25 per cent owner of Grameenphone, Bangladesh’s largest listed company. Telenor, the Norwegian telecom entity, owns 54 per cent.
The dispute began because he claimed he owed no tax on huge dividends, saying he spent it on “social ventures”. If accepted, every industrialist could claim the same, citing charity or zakat. There was no trace of where the money went. Much of it was laundered abroad without Bangladesh Bank permission, which is illegal. He built a personal system. So yes, he runs a criminal enterprise, but enjoyed powerful backing abroad.
Since 2007, he repeatedly attempted regime change and finally succeeded in 2024. But he has no plan to reconcile political parties or heal the nation. Instead, he agitates young people through TikTok demagogues living abroad.
With Awami League banned from the upcoming elections and Bangladesh deeply polarised, what specific challenges do you see for the party’s return to the mainstream?
The real question is not whether Awami League can return; it is whether the country will regain stability. If there is no stability, it doesn’t matter whether Awami League survives — it will survive anyway.
The worst-case scenario is that the February election will be one-sided and Awami League will be barred. Even if a new government forms, it will lack legitimacy because many will abstain — Awami League supporters, BNP supporters, everyone. With a weak mandate, how long can such a government sustain?
The military, currently acting as a buffer, cannot keep policing society forever. Once they return to the cantonment, a weak government will collapse quickly. Awami League is a party of protest. It has fought the Pakistan Army, Pakistan’s military junta, and Bangladesh’s own juntas. It knows how to survive outside power.
No one can guarantee a new government will last even a year. Already, people are demanding the ouster of the interim government. Even the interim regime knows this and is rushing toward elections.
What does this crisis mean for India-Bangladesh relations? And will India face pressure to extradite Sheikh Hasina?
India cannot be pressured by anyone. Even the United States could not pressure India; Bangladesh certainly cannot. There is deep interdependence in India-Bangladesh relations. India relies on Bangladesh to ensure that 170 million people, including pockets of deep poverty and extremism, remain contained and stable. Turning that entire population hostile would be dangerous.
It is in India’s interest to have a stable government in Bangladesh. People-to-people ties are strong. Many Bangladeshis come legally or illegally for work, medical services, and better livelihoods. But some political actors play rhetorical games. Dr. Yunus has no political constituency, so he can say anything — poke India about the Northeast, entertain Pakistani generals — things BNP never did because it needs voter support.
This interim regime has no accountability. They can do anything because they know they won’t last long.
Bangladesh depends on India for raw materials, food, and sustaining its export industries. Our food security is precarious. We must trade with India to earn foreign currency to buy essentials. This is interdependence.
A regular political government will not act against mutual interests. The real danger lies with extremist forces — Jamaat-e-Islami and the interim leadership — who are encouraging militia mobilisation, armed youth, and fantasies like Ghazwa-e-Hind. Some public officials are openly using this rhetoric.
They thrive on anarchy because they have no electoral constituency. Sensible leadership exists across parties, the Army, civil administration, and judiciary. They do not want a Ukraine-like or Myanmar-like situation. But the anarchists in charge only survive through chaos.
(The content above has been transcribed from video using a fine-tuned AI model. To ensure accuracy, quality, and editorial integrity, we employ a Human-In-The-Loop (HITL) process. While AI assists in creating the initial draft, our experienced editorial team carefully reviews, edits, and refines the content before publication. At The Federal, we combine the efficiency of AI with the expertise of human editors to deliver reliable and insightful journalism.)

