India’s nuclear energy push: Will it be high on promises but low in delivery?

After having achieved 50 per cent installed capacity of electricity from non-fossil fuel sources in July 2025 – five years ahead of the target (2030) – India is now embarking on rapidly raising its nuclear power capacity from 8.9 GW in 2025 to 22.5 GW by 2032 and 100 GW by 2047 (2025 budget).

As Prime Minister Narendra Modi laid the foundation for indigenous nuclear plants and Industry Minister Piyush Goyal's warm welcome of private players, experts raised red flags, such as weak laws and possible dilution of disaster liability in the sector.

On September 26, Modi laid the foundation stone for 4x700 MW indigenously-developed nuclear plants (MBEAPP) at Banswara in Rajasthan. The project will cost Rs 42,000 crore. This is the joint venture of two central PSUs, Nuclear Power Corporation of India Ltd (NPCIL) and National Thermal Power Corporation (NTPC).

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Private sector's entry

Two days earlier, Commerce and Industry Minister Piyush Goyal had said in New York that India was opening another front: allowing private entities into the nuclear energy sector (restricted to the public sector).

He said, “It's an area that we've been talking about for a long time. There were certain elements which needed to be set right. And I believe we are working in India to support private efforts in nuclear power.”

On March 31, 2025, US-based Holtec International had said it received the US authorisation to sell its SMR-300 (Small Modular Reactors of 300 MW) to three Indian entities – Larsen & Toubro, Tata Consulting Engineers, and its own subsidiary Holtec Asia. SMR-300 is a pressurised light water reactor of 300 MWe capacity. The Banswara plants mentioned earlier would have pressured heavy water reactors.

Note that the three Indian entities named are private entities.

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Holtec not yet under regulatory oversight

Holtec International further said that adding public sector units like NPCIL, DAE, AERB, and NTPC to the eligible list was delayed until the matter of assurances needed by the US from India was resolved to both countries’ satisfaction. It also required amendments to the US’s March 2025 authorisation.

Note that the NPCIL is under the administrative control of the Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) and is responsible for design, construction, commissioning, and operation of nuclear power reactors in India.

The Atomic Energy Regulatory Board (AERB) is the regulatory authority tasked to “develop safety policies in nuclear, radiation, and industrial safety areas”, which include developing nuclear “safety codes, guides and standards for siting, design, construction, commissioning, operation, and decommissioning of different types of nuclear and radiation facilities”.

Presumably, Holtec International and the Indian entities mentioned would already be negotiating deals, although it is yet to be officially confirmed. In July, a national daily quoted Holtec’s promoter and CEO, KP Singh, as saying that his company was planning to go public (IPO) in April-June 2026 to raise $5 billion for investing in its upcoming projects in India.

Red Flag 1: Holtec International is not yet under the regulatory control of India. It needs to first get a license from the AERB, and for that, the US authorisation must be amended.

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Holtec’s SMR-300 yet to be tried or tested

According to the US Department of Energy's (DOE) statement of April 2024, Holtec International has not yet deployed its SMR-300 commercially anywhere.

It said, “The firm plans to build its first two SMR-300s at the Palisades Nuclear Generating Station in Barnegat Bay in New Jersey and has also received interest from the international community. The company is currently in the early design review stages in the United Kingdom and Canada to deploy its SMR.”

The SMRs may need only 25-acres land to house two SMR-300s, be safe and efficient, etc. But they have not yet been tested on the ground.

Red Flag 2: Holtec International’s SMR-300 is yet to be tried or tested.

'123 Agreement'

The authorisation to Holtec International, DOE said, was an outcome of the “123 Agreement” signed by the two governments in 2008. The agreement was “Agreement for Co-operation between the Government of India and the Government of the United States of America concerning Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy”. Since it was done under Section 123 of the US’s Atomic Energy Act of 1954, it has been popularly called the “123 Agreement”.

This agreement ended sanctions on technology transfers to India and also its nuclear isolation – paving the way for Indian civil nuclear cooperation with the US and the rest of the world.

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Regulatory system not in place

Meanwhile, in the 2025 budget, the Centre announced “Nuclear Energy Mission for Viksit Bharat” to install 100 GW nuclear energy capacity to (i) enhance domestic nuclear capabilities, (ii) promote PPPs in the sector, and (iii) accelerate deployment of advanced nuclear technologies such as SMRs. The allocated budget was Rs 20,000 crore, aiming to develop at least five indigenously-designed and operational SMRs by 2033.

Soon thereafter, in April 2025, Reuters wrote, citing multiple government officials, that India was planning to “ease its nuclear liability laws to cap accident-related penalties on equipment suppliers” – mainly to attract US firms that were holding back due to the “risk of unlimited exposure”.

In August 2025, Jitendra Singh, MoS for Science and Technology, said that the DAE had “constituted a Task Force to look into various aspects like build, own, operation of NPPs by Private Sector, nuclear safety, security, safeguards, fuel procurement/fabrication, waste management, and decommissioning".

Red Flag 3: Indian regulatory systems are not in place to oversee the functioning of domestic and foreign private companies.

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Dilution of liabilities in case of disaster

Given India's legislative history, it is highly reprehensible that something as serious as liabilities for nuclear disasters is yet to be fixed. This is particularly so because often legislation has been bulldozed through Parliament using the ruling dispensation’s majority and/or subterfuge, without proper scrutiny or debate.

Recall the Bhopal gas tragedy of 1984 and the US firm Union Carbide at the centre of it. As against the Union of India’s suit seeking compensation of $3.3 billion on behalf of the victims, empowered by the Bhopal Gas Leak Disaster (Processing of Claims) Act of 1985 – passed a year after the disaster.

But the Supreme Court facilitated a negotiated settlement for $470 million in 1989 and closed all civil and criminal proceedings against the US firm. The court called this settlement “just, equitable, and fair”.

Union Carbide didn’t even have to remove over 300 tonnes of toxic waste dumped on its campus. The Supreme Court asked the Centre and Madhya Pradesh to clean Carbide’s mess in six months in 2012. This was finally done in June 2025.

The Centre and others representing the victims filed multiple curative petitions seeking reconsideration of the 1989 settlement. In 2023, a five-judge bench of the Supreme Court dismissed it with the following concluding remarks: “…finality was reached at an early stage by way of the settlement. Endeavours to reopen the same proved unsuccessful. Now the curative petitions have been filed by the Union of India, having not filed review petitions. Private parties who are here before us seek to ride on the coattails of the Union. This is not something we can countenance."

“We are thus of the view that for all the aforesaid reasons, the curative petitions cannot be entertained and we thus dismiss it, leaving the parties to bear their own costs,” ruled the court.

The purpose of the above lengthy quote is that even the Centre can’t undo once the damage is done, and the culprits can escape unscathed with paltry compensation.

Red Flag 4: Dilution of liabilities of nuclear suppliers in case of a nuclear disaster, without parliamentary scrutiny and debate inside and outside parliament, may hurt India more than help.

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Illogical nuclear liability law

Here is another point to ponder.

The laws to be amended to “ease its nuclear liability laws to cap accident-related penalties on equipment suppliers” are the Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage Act of 2010. The Atomic Energy Act of 1962 would also be needed to pave the way for private participation.

Look at the Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage Act of 2010. Section 6 provides that the “maximum amount of liability” for the operator in case of a nuclear disaster is “rupee equivalent of three hundred million Special Drawing Rights” ($300 million) or Rs 1,500 crore.

But Section 7 says, if the liability exceeds, “the Central Government shall be liable for nuclear damage to the extent such liability exceeds such liability of the operator”.

It gets even more sinister because Section 7 further says: “Provided that the Union Government may, by notification, assume full liability for a nuclear installation not operated by it if it thinks that it is necessary in the public interest.”

That is, in “public interest”, the Union Government is empowered to take responsibility for the entire compensation.

That is, the Union Government will take Indian taxpayers’ money to compensate the victims, fellow-Indians.

None explained the logic for this change. In fact, this provision was sneaked through when the Bill was already in Parliament for the final passage.

Also note, a compensation of $300 million was provided for a nuclear disaster, which was far less than $470 million that the Union Carbide paid for the 1984 leakage of highly-toxic Methyl Isocyanate (MIC) from its plant.

What scientific logic or evidence was employed to ascertain that a nuclear disaster would be less damaging than the MIC leakage?

Red Flag 5: Further dilution of the Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage Act of 2010 may well kill the 2010 law altogether. And if Section 7 is not removed, Indian taxpayers will end up paying for fellow-Indians who are singed in the nuclear disaster.

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High on promises, low in delivery

India may have achieved 50 per cent non-fossil fuel capacity in July 2025 five years ahead of the target, but do you know fossil fuel coal is the main source of electricity in India?

A Coal Ministry statement of April 4, 2025 said coal contributed “over 74 per cent of total power generation” – although its installed capacity is 49.2 per cent of the total. It has set the goal of adding 80 GW of coal-fired power plants by 2032 – 33 per cent to its 242 GW in 2025.

Two reasons for poor use of renewable energy like solar and wind (38 per cent of total installed capacity ) are lack of evacuation facilities (transmission and distribution networks) and storage. These are persistent issues arising out of lack of adequate investments in evacuation infrastructure and the development of storage technologies.

The Union Government may have big plans about nuclear safety standards and regulatory oversight, but given India’s abysmal regulatory scenario and the precedent set by the Union Carbide case, Indian policymakers and planners would do well to move ahead with caution.

Red Flag 6: Merely installing capacity is not enough if the ground has not been prepared with careful planning and foresight.