Are Muslims outnumbering Hindus? Author SY Quraishi on Modi’s demographic mission

India’s debate on “demographic change” is back in the spotlight after the Prime Minister announced a high-powered demographic commission on August 15 from the Red Fort.

In the latest episode of Off The Beaten Track on The Federal's YouTube channel, former Chief Election Commissioner SY Quraishi, who is also the author of The Population Myth: Islam, Family Planning and Politics in India, cuts through rhetoric to examine data, migration, religion, and the politics of electoral rolls. All answers below are by the interviewee, lightly edited for clarity and flow.

Why has “demography” become a political flashpoint now, and what exactly is being promised by a “high-powered demographic commission”?

The Prime Minister framed a grave national concern: conspiracies to alter India’s demography, infiltrators taking jobs, threatening women, misleading tribals, and endangering national security. He announced a high-powered demographic mission to address this “deliberately and time-bound.” If infiltration is truly disturbing demography, it should have been stopped already—and that’s the government’s responsibility. This administration has had 11 years; the BJP also governed 1998–2004, when the 2000 National Population Policy set a replacement-level fertility target (2.1) initially for 2010, achieved a few years later. Why announce such a mission now, and why not earlier?

Your book addressed the claim that Indian Muslims are trying to outnumber Hindus. What led you to write it, and what did you find?

I began the project in 1995 after the UNFPA asked me to write an approach paper on “population and Islam.” I wasn’t a health or Islamic scholar; my exposure was administrative. I agreed to do it essentially pro bono. I started with the same popular perception many had: that Muslims have “too many” children. But NFHS-1 data (the first National Family Health Survey) revealed something else—everyone was adding to the population, Muslims a bit more then, but they were also adopting family planning faster than others. Over subsequent NFHS rounds, they’ve narrowed the gap further. By the time I wrote the book (2021), NFHS-4 was available; NFHS-5 came after, and I updated figures. The core point stands: Muslims are catching up fastest on family planning.

How do you respond to political slogans about polygamy and hum paanch, hamare pachees ('we five, ours 25' — a play on 'we two, ours two')?

They’re mischievous and factually impossible in India. Consider the long-standing adverse sex ratio—there simply aren’t enough women. In 2011 it was about 940 women per 1,000 men; even two wives are a practical impossibility. Such slogans are crafted to stoke anger and hatred, not to reflect demography.

Is there any evidence of a conspiracy by Muslims in India (or globally) to change India’s population balance?

None that I found. I conducted primary studies in Alwar (Mewat), Lucknow, and Hyderabad among those not using family planning. About 70% said they believed family planning was “against religion.” No one said they were increasing numbers for political power. That means the main barrier is a theological misunderstanding, which is solvable through education.

So what does Islam actually say about family planning?

The Quran explicitly bans many things—alcohol, usury, sex outside marriage—but not family planning. There’s even a verse stating that whatever God wishes to forbid is explained in detail; there’s no explicit prohibition on family planning. Misinterpretations arise from verses about not killing children and God providing sustenance; some take this as a licence to “keep producing.” Authoritative hadith show permissibility: one tradition endorses al-azl (withdrawal) when someone with a large family sought guidance; another advises fasting for those unable to marry due to means. These indicate responsible spacing and planning are consistent with faith.

If religion isn’t the driver, what explains higher fertility in some groups and regions?

Three cross-religious factors: literacy, income, and service delivery. Higher education lowers fertility; Muslims are among the most educationally deprived, so the solution is education. Income matters—richer families have fewer children; Muslims are poorer on average, and economic boycotts only worsen this. Finally, access: you need clinics, nurses, and supplies; Muslim clusters often have the poorest service delivery. Despite that, adoption has been strong—about a fifth have even opted for sterilization, which many believe is religiously discouraged.

Will Muslims “overtake” Hindus? Some cite 1951 vs 2011 percentages to argue that trend.

From roughly under 10% to 14.2% over about 60 years is an increase of around 4 percentage points. To reach 51% would require around 40 more points; at the old rate, that’s about 600 years—if nothing else changed. But a lot has changed: Muslims are adopting family planning fastest. I even asked mathematicians—former Delhi University VC Dinesh Singh and his colleague Ajay Kumar—to model it; their conclusion was blunt: the “overtake” doesn’t happen.

What about “infiltrators” from Bangladesh—aren’t they changing the demography of Assam, West Bengal, and Tripura?

Migration is a normal human phenomenon—domestic and international. Two lakh Indians surrender citizenship each year seeking greener pastures abroad; we don’t call them “termites.” Studies show much of the post-Partition movement into West Bengal has been Hindu; overall numbers of Muslim migrants often cited are small relative to India’s 143 crore. That said, no illegal entry should be allowed—the government must enforce the border. Painting all Bengali-speaking Muslims as foreigners, demanding impossible paperwork, and “pushing back” people erodes rights and fuels communal hostility.

The NRC in Assam excluded around 19 lakh people in 2019. Does that complicate the ‘illegal infiltrator’ narrative?

The final NRC left out a little over 19 lakh; many of those were Hindus. That undercut a simplistic communal narrative and created a political dilemma. Meanwhile, people without documentation face harassment, despite complex familial and regional histories across both sides of the Bengal border.

Let’s connect this to elections. Do the Special Intensive Revision (SIR) of rolls and the “demographic” politics intersect?

Initially, I avoided speculating. But if you place the Red Fort speech alongside SIR, suspicions arise that certain communities might be targeted for exclusion in states like Bihar, West Bengal, and Assam (both polling in 2026). I’ve declined thousands of media requests to opine prematurely. My position is simple: if the final rolls include every eligible voter and exclude every ineligible one—and the Election Commission certifies that on affidavit—excellent. If we see mass deletions or bogus inclusions, there will rightly be an uproar. Let’s judge by the final figures, not speculation.

Given the charged environment, what should policy focus on right now?

On facts, rights, and delivery. Invest in education and income security across communities; strengthen last-mile health services where they’re weakest; stop collective punishment through economic and bureaucratic harassment. If infiltration is real, fix enforcement. But don’t demonise entire populations or weaponize demography for politics.

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