KS Dakshina Murthy

India’s resurgent ties with China temporary, or for keeps?


Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) Narendra Modi, Vladimir Putin, Xi Jinping
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CAN INDIA REALLY LAUGH? Besides PM Modi, Chinese President Xi Jinping and his Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin will attend the upcoming SCO meet in Tianjin. PTI Photo  

However close India moves towards China, Beijing’s loyalty is first and foremost to Pakistan

The overnight, dramatic shift in India’s foreign policy, tilting towards Beijing to form a veritable India-China-Russia axis, is a rare move in diplomacy, given the glacial speed of such changes, generally.

However, what cannot be overlooked is that New Delhi’s shift is largely a reaction to United States President Donald Trump’s punitive tariff and pressure on the Modi government to halt oil imports from Russia. Therefore, the question is whether the newfound axis is here to stay or will reverse when the icy mood between Trump and Modi thaws somewhat.

Trump's domino effect

Since Trump announced a 50 per cent tariff on India earlier this month, there has been a flurry of activity among India, Russia, and China, with top officials of the three countries visiting each other and reaffirming a newfound bond rarely seen earlier. These visits will be capped by Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s trip to China later this month for the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation summit.

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Keeping aside the optics of the new dalliance, it is clear that the axis is necessary but could prove opportunistic. For, there are long-festering sticking points between New Delhi and Beijing. However close India moves towards China, Beijing’s loyalty is first and foremost to Pakistan. The border dispute with China too lurks in the background, exemplified by the violent Galwan Valley episode in 2020.

Beijing calling, for obvious reasons

While the latest shift towards China has progressed rapidly, New Delhi had, for unrelated reasons, started normalising relations with Beijing since the last months of the previous Joe Biden administration in late 2024.
This happened when the US accused Indian agents of plotting to kill a US-based Khalistani activist Gurupatwant Singh Pannun.

The Biden administration had earlier supported Canada, which blamed Indian agents for the assassination of a Khalistani activist, Hardeep Singh Nijjar. It worsened when US law enforcement indicted top Indian businessman and a close aide of Prime Minister Narendra Modi, Gautam Adani, of corruption and fraud in a solar project and planned to prosecute him.
The situation can reverse equally quickly if the Ukraine-Russia war ends and India is left free to continue buying oil from Moscow or from wherever it wants.
In a sobering realisation New Delhi discovered that its “strategic” relationship with the US cut no ice when it came to investigating accusations against India in both the Pannun and Adani cases. India had no option but to defuse tensions with China as it could not entirely depend on its relationship with the US to protect itself from Beijing’s predatory moves across the border. It was more pragmatic for New Delhi to mend ties with its neighbour than being left to fend for itself in a hostile situation.
Trump, obviously, thinks otherwise – that ties with India are not indispensable

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Mutual troop disengagement followed in eastern Ladakh along the Line of Actual Control, and attempts were made to kickstart ties that had gone into limbo following the Galwan Valley incident of 2020. The reduction in tensions between the two neighbours, in more ways than one, helped India to cosy up to China when Trump shocked India with his tariffs.

Visitor visa for Chinese

Among other things, India has restarted issuing visitor visas for Chinese. Beijing has resumed exporting much-needed rare earth material for making mobile phones and other electronic goods to India.

The million rupee-yuan question is: how reliable an ally can China be for India? For now, the target is the US and it is politically expedient for Beijing to move closer to New Delhi, to cock a snook at its main rival, Washington.

Beware, there is a red line

But there is a red line in India’s relationship with China, and that cannot be crossed. Just this week, when Chinese Ambassador to India Xu Feihong was asked by reporters about cross-border terrorism, he echoed the Pakistan position, stating “Pakistan too is a victim of terrorism”. New Delhi’s stated position has been to blame Pakistan for terrorist violence in India but Xu was not willing to concede that.

Even more serious was Beijing’s reported involvement in helping Islamabad militarily, including helping it operate its latest state-of-the-art Chinese-made weaponry during the recent armed conflict between India and Pakistan following the Pahalgam terror attack. While the Modi government has expressed muscular opinions on this issue and relations are all but frozen with the neighbour, it has chosen to ignore China’s role in enhancing Pakistan’s prowess.

Import-export dynamics

New Delhi’s dependence on China gives the Xi Jinping dispensation a crucial leverage to dominate the narrative in Asia. On the trade front, India imports more goods from China than it exports. In 2024, India exported a measly $15 billion worth of goods to China while importing goods worth nearly $127 billion.

India’s estrangement with the Trump administration will, on the face of it, serve to reduce the US’s grip on the subcontinent and dilute Washington’s hold over India in policing the South China Seas and parts of the Pacific. The Quad, of which India is a member, would be handicapped if New Delhi is unwilling to play ball. But these are issues that the Trump administration appears scarcely bothered about.

Trump being warned, alerted

Within the US, former officials like Nikki Haley have warned Trump against frittering away ties that have been assiduously built with India over the years. Economist Jeffrey Sachs was quoted as saying antagonising India was self-destructive to US foreign policy interests, and would drive New Delhi closer to rival powers like China.

Trump, obviously, thinks otherwise – that ties with India are not indispensable. Or, as Trump’s officials explain, India has been cut out of its strategic equation in order to force it to stop importing oil from Russia. Arm-twisting, in other words.

Situation can change quickly

The situation can reverse equally quickly if the Ukraine-Russia war ends and India is left free to continue buying oil from Moscow or from wherever it wants. When that happens, the question is whether India will move back again closer to the US. After all, India’s $80 billion worth exports to the US is at stake, a figure that none in New Delhi can easily wink at.

Also Read: Modi’s friend’ Trump’s 50 pc tariff blows hole in India’s foreign policy

Whether one likes it or not, the fact is that New Delhi is at a disadvantage both against China and the US, either from excessive imports or exports. Unfortunately for India, hypothetically, if India stops sending goods to the US, Washington can source them from elsewhere. Similarly, if India stops importing from China, there are other countries which can absorb Beijing’s products.

India on a sticky wicket

Either way, it is India which gets hurt. So when things sour with one, there is a tendency to run to the other – to the US after Galwan, and now to China after Trump’s tariff. Russia, fortunately for India, has been a time-tested partner but is now caught up in its own struggles to be of much use to New Delhi.

Whether one likes it or not, the fact is that New Delhi is at a disadvantage both against China and the US

So, where does that leave India? Unless some fundamental changes occur, like India being able to face headwinds on its own from Washington or Beijing, it is inevitable that New Delhi will find itself at the mercy of bigger powers in the foreseeable future.

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