'Vijay can't convert a crowd into a party; he missed a chance to ally with AIADMK'

As Tamil Nadu gears up for the crucial 2026 Assembly election, the state’s political battlefield is witnessing shifts unseen in decades.

In an exclusive interview with The Federal, RSS ideologue S Gurumurthy, editor of Tamil political weekly Thuglak, decodes the changing dynamics between the DMK, AIADMK, BJP and rising stars like actor Vijay, highlighting how alliances, identity politics, and grassroots mobilisation could determine the outcome.

Gurumurthy points out that the BJP is steadily laying the groundwork for a long-term presence in the state, prioritising cultural outreach, social engineering, and local organisation over short-term gains. He cautions that momentum alone cannot translate into victory without credible alliances and a deep organisational structure.

Also read: No Sanatana in Sangam literature: Tamil scholar challenges Gurumurthy's claims

Looking beyond Tamil Nadu, he frames India’s democracy as a unique combination of civilisational cohesion, entrepreneurial energy, and community networks. These strengths, he argues, enable India to absorb economic and political shocks that have destabilised neighbouring countries, shaping policy priorities and party strategies across the nation. Edited excerpts:

We have seen student unrest leading to political upheaval in Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, and now Nepal. What is your assessment of this trend, and what lessons does it hold for India?

I don’t think the lessons for India matter here. The lessons for them from India are important. Not all countries are mature enough for democracy. Take Pakistan, for example. It has been with us since Independence, but it was not mature for democracy. They could not even frame a constitution for years, and when they finally did, the military took over. Even today, it has not settled as a functioning democracy.

For democracy to succeed, you need a shared philosophy of mutual tolerance. Without mutual tolerance, democracy cannot survive. Indian civilisation — particularly Hindu civilisation — has fostered this virtue. And that is why, despite our unbelievably diverse and complex population with different beliefs, we have managed to sustain a functioning democracy.

In my view, the TN election will essentially be a contest between the DMK and whoever is positioned strongly against it. A powerful anti-establishment wave is already building against the DMK, and the party lacks the intellectual strength to counter it. Money can influence 2-3 per cent of votes, not 20.

Look at Bangladesh, formerly East Pakistan. It was born through violence in 1971. That very culture of violence, once promoted, turned back upon itself. The country could have become a democracy, but Mujibur Rahman, despite being a popular leader, turned virtually into a dictator. A popular leader need not become a dictator, but he felt besieged and responded that way. Mature leadership is vital to guide a nation into democracy — and this did not happen in Pakistan or in Bangladesh.

Then there is Nepal. It was historically a kingdom. The question of whether Nepal could sustain itself as a nation is still open. In fact, at one point, Nepal wanted to be part of India. Even Sri Lanka wanted to be part of India. But given the challenges India itself faced, Jawaharlal Nehru probably decided against taking on additional geographies and populations. Still, India and Nepal have shared deep historical, religious, and cultural ties.

When the monarchy gave way, China entered Nepal, and that was the first destabilising factor. Since then, Nepal has never fully recovered. Its society remains split. These examples show that many of these countries have not yet matured enough for democracy.

Also read: Vice-President CP Radhakrishnan’s mentor recounts his formative years

Across Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, and now Nepal, the underlying factor is the economy. Inequality is stark — in Nepal, the top 1 per cent holds 25 per cent of the wealth while the bottom half has only 4 per cent. India too faces inequality: the richest 1 per cent controls 40 per cent of wealth and 22 per cent of income. Unemployment remains high, with estimates ranging between 5.6 per cent and 7 per cent. Yet the government has managed better, largely through free rations to 80 crore people — a safety net many countries cannot provide. How do you view this, and is India’s approach sustainable?

You are drawing me into a much larger discussion. Broadly, there are three economic models I know of, from the study of economic history.

The first is the capitalist model, which accumulates not only money but also knowledge as the dominant wealth-creating force. This is represented by stock markets and stock values. Piketty has written extensively about this wealth shift. My own view, however, is that in capitalism, statistics are not the key issue. What truly matters is whether a country is able to lift people out of poverty — that is the foremost priority. In this respect, India has done well in the last decade. Redistribution of economic power is best achieved gradually through the spread of education and knowledge, rather than by forcibly redistributing physical wealth.

On Prime Minister Modi’s tenure, 75 is not a limiting factor. He may choose to step down if he wishes, but there is no requirement for him to do so.

The second is the communist model, where all wealth is accumulated in the hands of the state, which claims to act on behalf of the people. That model, too, did not deliver as promised.

The third is the Indian alternative. Here, local communities largely manage their own resources and opportunities. Karl Marx himself, writing in 1853, observed that there was very little exploitation in Indian villages because the distance between producer and consumer was minimal. But once you create a large economy, that distance grows, and the problem of wealth distribution arises.

In my view, India has managed these challenges better than most countries — perhaps Japan has done better, but even advanced economies like America face the same problems. What matters is not statistics alone, but the overall system. Amartya Sen highlighted this when he compared China and India. During the Great Leap Forward famine, millions died in China, but the news emerged only 15 years later. In India, by contrast, even a single reported death from hunger in Kalahandi could stall Parliament. His point was that democracy helps relieve economic distress by ensuring that problems are communicated and addressed quickly.

This is why the Indian economy is supported not only by a vibrant parliamentary democracy and free media, but also by civilisational democracy — a culture of social cohesion and moral responsibility. For that reason, comparing unemployment data across countries is not always meaningful.

Of course, data is important. But what matters equally is how you manage the problems. The issue is not India’s alone; it is the limitation of global economic models. Yet India has adapted better than most, including in the era of globalisation.

I asked Rajini and Kamal Haasan if they had five trustworthy people to form a party; Rajini had three, Kamal none. Without trusted individuals, forming a party is impossible.

One more factor is often overlooked: family and community. In India, the family distributes income and opportunities. Remove family, and there is no India; remove communities, and there is no India. This is our social capital. In America, by contrast, families play a limited economic role; theirs is a contract-based society, while ours is relation-based. Even caste politics reflects this relational dimension.

So, before comparing India with other countries purely on economic statistics, one must take a deeper look at India’s unique civilisational, cultural, and social foundations.

Also read: PMK founder S Ramadoss expels son Anbumani from party

India is now the fourth-largest economy and soon to be the third, but key indicators like unemployment and manufacturing don’t fully reflect that growth. Despite tax cuts, incentives, and reforms, the expected changes haven’t materialised. How do you see this?

This is a subject I have studied in depth and written about, and some of that has also benefited government policies. India is sustained by nearly 70 million micro-enterprises, which form the springboard of entrepreneurship. India has always been an entrepreneurial economy, and it will succeed only as such. It is, by nature, a self-employing economy.

The shift toward an employer–employee economy began during colonial rule and was reinforced during the socialist era. Globalisation and liberalisation did not reverse it. Yet, Indian society continued to pursue self-employment. Globally, too, there is a trend in this direction: in 1990, Fortune 500 companies employed 17 per cent of the workforce; today it is just 9 per cent. This spirit is what manifested in schemes like Mudra loans, where small borrowers steadily scale up to become entrepreneurs.

I have seen this firsthand, even while teaching at IIT. I used to ask students whether they were studying only to become employees, or whether they had a responsibility to create employment. The real problem of unemployment lies among graduates, many of whom emerge with degrees that the market does not demand. Meanwhile, MSMEs and micro-industries — from gems and jewellery to fisheries and electronics — face external shocks, such as US tariffs, which strain them further.

What Vijay is attempting is different — he is trying to convert a crowd into a party. A large crowd is impressive, but it doesn’t guarantee political success.

But India’s economy is being rebuilt bottom-up. The direct connect between state and society, achieved through initiatives like Jan Dhan, was unimaginable 15 years ago. Today, money flows directly to people without leakage. This alignment between state, society, and market is a unique strength of India’s economic structure.

Now, take the recent US tariff hikes. These are temporary pressures. The 25 per cent duty is linked to the Ukraine war, which, once resolved, will ease. Moreover, our dependence on the American market is limited compared to East Asian economies. Many exporters in Tiruppur, for example, have already diversified into domestic and European markets. Even with 25 per cent tariffs, they remain competitive.

This points to a larger truth: Indian businesses must diversify. Some have already done so. TVS Motors, for instance, has made Africa a major market. The world is no longer defined only by America or Europe.

Technology, too, is undergoing a transformation. For decades, technology transfer was tightly controlled by institutions and nations. But now, with the collapse of WTO frameworks and the rise of individual innovators, technology is spreading differently. Growth in AI and other fields is increasingly driven by individuals, not institutions. The global economic order itself is shifting rapidly, and India must position itself within this new landscape.

Also read: GST 2.0 welcome relief for Tiruppur SMEs, but not ultimate fix to Trump’s tariffs

How do you see the prospects of the BJP here, especially in the context of the AIADMK, which appears to be in flux — with leaders leaving, others negotiating, and yet an alliance in place with the BJP? How do you view this situation?

The situation today will not be the situation before the elections. Most parties are so stressed that they have started campaigning eight months in advance. I even wrote in Tughlak that whatever is said now will be forgotten in two months.

The very fact that the BJP has become a factor in Tamil Nadu is significant, because earlier it was not even in the picture. I recall when Arvind Kejriwal met me before his agitation in 2011. He asked how the Indian Express kept the Bofors issue alive for three years before the 1989 election. I told him that it was possible then because it was an all-round struggle — inside Parliament, outside on the streets, and sustained by the media. Today, television media kills any issue in a month. So, expecting the present situation to remain unchanged till the 2026 election ignores this paradigm shift.

In my view, the election will essentially be a contest between the DMK and whoever is positioned strongly against it. A powerful anti-establishment wave is already building against the DMK, and the party lacks the intellectual strength to counter it. Money can influence 2-3 per cent of votes, not 20.

Much will depend on whether the BJP and AIADMK can together channel this anti-DMK sentiment, despite not fully trusting each other. In a sense, Annamalai is right when he says the politics is not yet set against the DMK. With issues fading quickly in today’s media environment, the real battle will take shape much closer to the elections.

BJP has worked hard in Tamil Nadu — social engineering, cultural connections, projecting Tamil identity, even appointing Annamalai, who built ground support. Why did it give up on Annamalai? Is it lack of confidence or just a short-term play for quick results?

Take Maharashtra, for example. The BJP began as a junior partner of the Shiv Sena. It was not sudden or overnight — the party built itself up steadily.

In Tamil Nadu, too, the BJP had a Brahminical face because of the RSS. Both Maharashtra and Tamil Nadu are famous for anti-Brahmin politics. In Maharashtra, it took nearly 20 years to overcome that barrier. To make a Brahmin the Chief Minister there was nothing short of a miracle. It reflected the very hard, basic work that had been put in to shift the polity.

Watch: Tamil Nadu political churn: What is brewing ahead of 2026 polls?

The same kind of groundwork is needed in Tamil Nadu — in fact, more, not less. Perhaps Annamalai was moving too fast, faster than was good for himself or for the BJP’s collective strategy. So, the party decided not to project him or the BJP too much in ways that could impede its long-term goal of emerging as the main force.

In my view, that was the right decision. Annamalai also fell in line with it. It is not that he was unhappy; he too understood that there was a strategy behind it. So, the 2026 elections are not BJP’s primary target.

Possibly, but his (Annamalai’s) momentum had reached a certain tipping point. He demonstrated in the 2024 elections that he could increase vote share. However, on its own, BJP could not have carried it — an alliance was necessary.

Because of socio-political and historical reasons — over a 100 years of anti-North, anti-Hindi, and anti-Aryan sentiment — Tamil Nadu’s political landscape is deeply entrenched. Yet, the state is now “melting” for two reasons. First, BJP is in a position to make a difference. Until 1965, the DMK did not truly accept Tamil as a great language or Thirukkural as a key literary work. It pursued the original Dravidian theory, a racial philosophy devoid of ideology, often dismissing Tamil literature as barbaric.

Only later, under Periyar’s critique, did the DMK begin to embrace Tamil identity, but it was largely symbolic. From its formation in 1948-49 until the early 1960s, DMK leaders, including Annadurai, wrote extensively — but barely acknowledged Tamil literature or Thirukkural. Even Karunanidhi’s first serious engagement with Thirukkural came only in 1996. Today, these historical narratives are increasingly entering the public domain.

Perhaps Annamalai was moving too fast, faster than was good for himself or for the BJP’s collective strategy. So, the party decided not to project him in ways that could impede its long-term goal of emerging as the main force.

While critics argue that the DMK has “stolen” Tamil identity, it is important to note that the Congress never addressed these aspirations effectively. Tamil scholars in the 19th and early 20th centuries were nationalists, but Congress, as a dominant all-India party, largely ignored regional and symbolic gestures, such as renaming the state Tamil Nadu, which could have connected with local sentiments. This neglect contributed to political losses in Kerala, Karnataka, and Odisha.

The question then arises: could BJP face similar criticism if it engages with Tamil identity symbolically — through gestures like vanakkam or highlighting Tamil symbols? The BJP’s connection, however, is deeper than symbolism. Tamil literature itself accepts Sanatana Dharma. The DMK faces a dilemma: having abandoned Dravidianism, it must reconcile its reverence for Periyar, who opposed many Tamil cultural values, with Tamil identity. BJP, on the other hand, aligns with the broader spiritual and literary heritage of the state, giving it an advantage in public discourse.

Ultimately, this debate over Tamil identity is more beneficial to BJP than to DMK.

Read/Watch | Tamil scholar V Arasu counters Gurumurthy's claim, says there's no Sanatana in Sangam literature

What do you think of actor Vijay’s entry into Tamil Nadu politics? Earlier, there was a strong push to bring Rajinikanth, which didn’t work for various reasons. Actor Vijay, however, has a very strong popular appeal. I agree with the view I’ve shared before: it’s not like MGR or other leaders of the past, who had long-lasting political grounding before entering politics. Vijay doesn’t have that foundation. Yet, looking at the crowds he draws, particularly among the younger generation, there seems to be a huge appeal. Do you think this superficial momentum can be translated into real political influence?

I have been observing Tamil politics closely, particularly when MGR entered the political scene. MGR’s entry was not an individual move. The MGR Rasikar Manrams within the DMK had 45-50 MLAs, 4-5 ministers, and 10-12 MPs. It was essentially a party within a party, with a structure, hierarchy, and district secretaries. The DMK effectively split into two. MGR was unparalleled, so his example is unique and not replicable.

The next major figure to try something similar was Vijayakanth. I still remember waiting eight hours in Mailam as his crowd passed by — it was immense. Regarding Rajinikanth, contrary to popular belief, I wanted him to enter politics, and I even supported him. But converting a crowd into a structured party is no easy task. I asked Rajini and Kamal Haasan if they had five trustworthy people to form a party; Rajini had three, Kamal none. Without trusted individuals, forming a party is impossible. Ultimately, Rajinikanth could not convert his crowd into a party.

What Vijay is attempting is different — he is trying to convert a crowd into a party. A large crowd is impressive, but it doesn’t guarantee political success. If Vijay aims to challenge the DMK in 2026, he faces the same dynamics as in 1996, when Vaiko’s momentum was absorbed by alliances. Vijay will need an alliance to be effective.

He missed the chance to ally with the AIADMK because they are already with the BJP and are unlikely to be a junior partner. Congress could play that junior role; if Vijay joins forces with them and picks up a few key figures, he could emerge as a credible alternative to the DMK. But attempting to go solo and wield the sword alone is unlikely to work.

After the Ram Janmabhoomi issue, Kashi and Mathura remain on the agenda. Do you think these will be pursued with the same vigour, and where do they currently stand?

Having been involved in the Ram Janmabhoomi movement, including negotiations with Muslims in 1990-91 and again in 2023, I can say that at the time, Muslims were actually willing to give up. KK Mohammed of Kerala has written about this in detail. It was the Leftists who prevented a resolution. The Ram Janmabhoomi issue could have been solved in 1990, but fringe elements and vote-bank politics converted it into a prolonged religious conflict.

For Muslims, places like the Gyanvapi Masjid are not intensely sacred; only about 300 people perform namaz there weekly. The Mathura mosque sees even less activity. Today, there is little likelihood of a movement comparable to the Ram Janmabhoomi agitation, and even Hindus are not deeply invested.

A negotiated settlement is possible. In Mathura, the court has already stipulated that reconstruction or similar actions cannot occur for the next 50 years, allowing tensions to dissipate. If a similar opportunity for settlement arises, no political party could realistically prevent Muslims from agreeing. Thus, both Kashi and Mathura could see negotiated outcomes, while other related issues hold little significance for Hindus.

Mohan Bhagwat, the Sarsanghchalak of the RSS, has turned 75, and has received greetings from many, including the Prime Minister. Do you know how the transition of leadership in the RSS takes place, and what we can expect after Vijaya Dashami?

In the RSS, the Sarsanghchalak generally decides how long he will continue, though he consults the team. The 75-year rule exists because the RSS is a youthful organisation, and its leaders are expected to remain active and mobile. When the rule was framed, some leaders were physically weak, so it applied only to the RSS. Mohan Bhagwat may choose to retire, but the team must also agree, and he has hinted at this possibility.

At one point, Nepal wanted to be part of India. Even Sri Lanka wanted to be part of India. But given the challenges India itself faced, Jawaharlal Nehru probably decided against taking on additional geographies and populations.

Bhagat faced the challenge of a global leader emerging within the RSS with a towering personality. Despite that, he maintained the stature of the Sarsanghchalak and the organisation’s identity, a remarkable achievement. This is possible because the RSS has not made itself dependent on state power, unlike some other Sanghs.

Contrary to some claims, the RSS did not abstain from the 2024 elections. Since 2001, it has always worked where required, but it is the BJP that must enthuse the RSS, not the other way around.

As for the BJP, there is no strict age rule like in the RSS. Even leaders like Advani and Murli Manohar Joshi served into their late 70s. When Modi assumed leadership, a generational change occurred in both the RSS and BJP — not because of age, but to bring in the next generation. This transition avoided conflicts between the old and new generations, a challenge that other parties like Congress struggle with. On Prime Minister Modi’s tenure, 75 is not a limiting factor. This age rule does not apply to the BJP. He may choose to step down if he wishes, but there is no requirement for him to do so.

You were remarkably prescient back in 2012 when you predicted that Modi would become the next Prime Minister. Looking at BJP today, where do you see the party standing? Despite the Prime Minister’s enduring popularity, there have been challenges, such as delays in appointing new state chiefs. How do you assess BJP’s growth and its trajectory under Modi’s leadership?

BJP is a highly consultative party, despite having a very dominant leader. From my understanding of its inner workings, no single person makes decisions unilaterally. Even if the leader prefers a particular course of action, he must take many people into confidence and build consensus.

This is one reason why decisions in BJP sometimes get delayed. Delay doesn’t mean confusion — it often means consensus-building is still underway. Moreover, in power, the party has far more responsibilities than when in Opposition, so timing is adjusted accordingly.

When it comes to selecting a Prime Ministerial candidate, the RSS is consulted alongside the BJP. There are two key matters where consultation happens: the choice of the President and the choice of the Prime Minister. The only formal link between RSS and BJP is that the BJP General Secretary is always an RSS pracharak.

The RSS maintains its distinct identity, independent of state power, and promotes its organisation without relying on government positions. This ability to operate autonomously is a lesson for many socio-political movements.

So, I don’t see this as an issue. At the appropriate time, all stakeholders will come together and decide who is the best person — just as happened in the case of Modi.

How do you view the Bihar elections and the SIR (Special Intensive Review)? Is it just an electoral roll update, or part of the larger demographic mission the Prime Minister mentioned? Purification of the electoral rolls must happen. But why the hurry — why before the election?

If I were the Election Commission, I would implement it in one state first. Bihar happens to come next; what’s wrong with that? Elections occur every year, so this question will always arise, but it’s a misleading question.

Indian businesses must diversify. Some have already done so. TVS Motors, for instance, has made Africa a major market. The world is no longer defined only by America or Europe.

Summary reviews have been done every one or two years before elections, but they’re largely meaningless — anyone can get enrolled. When I was in political parties, including the Congress, we used to go house to house to check voter status. No party does that now; it’s left to the Election Commission. Now, 65 lakh people have been removed, and even the Supreme Court has noted this. That’s how participatory democracy functions — it’s not just an electoral process.

As for the broader demographic mission, SIR isn’t the tool for it. For instance, certain people in sensitive border areas may need relocation for security and developmental reasons. The aim is to distribute the population without affecting demographic balance. As they say, demography is destiny.