Operation Sindoor | India’s win, risks, and rising isolation |Interview

India's response to the Pahalgam terror attack through Operation Sindoor has not only triggered intense political discourse at home but also recalibrated regional and global dynamics. In this in-depth conversation, political scientist Christophe Jaffrelot unpacks the diplomatic, military, and ideological consequences of the conflict, including its impact on the Hindutva narrative, BJP strategy, caste politics, and India’s fragile international support.

Q: How do you assess the impact of Operation Sindhu and the Pehalgam attack on Indian and regional politics?

Christophe Jaffrelot: It has had major consequences on both sides of the border. In Pakistan, the military — previously unpopular for jailing Imran Khan and aligning with discredited parties — has reemerged as a saviour. The Army is now seen as having won the war, and this narrative has reshaped Pakistani domestic politics.

For India, the most significant shift is China’s open support for Pakistan. This is a first in India-Pakistan conflicts. China helped militarily—supplying effective jets—diplomatically, by speaking out in support of Pakistan’s sovereignty, and in intelligence sharing. This realignment alters the regional balance and must be acknowledged.

Q: Can you explain how this shift with China affects India’s long-term regional outlook?

Jaffrelot: Before this conflict, India and China were converging economically. The 2024 post-election Budget Session and Economic Survey indicated that India needed Chinese investment and manufacturing input. Diplomatically, there was even a sentiment that border tensions were resolved.

Operation Sindoor has reversed that trend. China siding with Pakistan creates a difficult geopolitical environment for India — not just with Pakistan but also in Nepal, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Maldives, and Afghanistan, where China is expanding influence. This undermines India’s strategic position in South Asia.

Q: Has India received any significant international support post-Sindhu?

Jaffrelot: Not really. While Pakistan is blamed for the terror attack, it hasn’t been isolated — thanks to support from China, Turkey, and even passive responses from other UNSC members.

India, despite being the victim, finds itself diplomatically isolated. Countries India considers friendly, including the U.S., have reacted with restraint. Washington's first responses were non-committal. This prompted India to dispatch multiple delegations worldwide to build support, signaling a real problem in foreign perception.

Q: What about the ceasefire? Did the US play a role in forcing India’s hand?

Jaffrelot: Absolutely. Donald Trump tweeted about a ceasefire before India or Pakistan did. That alone shows the ceasefire was brokered externally. This breaks from the bilateral framework of the Shimla Agreement (1972) and revives international mediation in Kashmir.

For the U.S., this was not like 1999 where Pakistan was summoned and told to withdraw. Here, both countries were treated as equals. Pakistan has long craved parity with India — this episode gave them just that.

Q: Has Modi’s government miscalculated the international fallout?

Jaffrelot: Yes. The Modi doctrine of escalating every terror attack with a bigger military response is risky. It fosters international intervention, especially from the U.S., which nullifies India’s strategic gains.

Additionally, Modi’s statements — that every attack will be met with force, that India has called Pakistan’s nuclear bluff, and that non-state actors are now seen as one with the Pakistani state — only escalate tensions. Each retaliation raises the stakes, and at some point, it may become unmanageable.

Q: What about the domestic political fallout? Has this impacted Hindutva or Modi's image?

Jaffrelot: It’s early, but clearly, there was an attempt to repeat the Balakot 2019 script—a successful military response that translated into electoral success. Operation Sindoor was far more intense, striking nine sites including those outside PoK. But crossing red lines, like targeting nuclear storage sites, prompted international alarm and the ceasefire.

Many Modi supporters expected a “1971 moment,” and their disillusionment is real. However, the BJP may retain its support due to a lack of political alternatives.

Q: What’s your take on the Congress party’s AI-generated Indira Gandhi video targeting Modi?

Jaffrelot: It plays to public nostalgia for strong leadership. But the comparison between 1971 and 2025 is flawed. In 1971, India supported an internal liberation movement, not attempted to dismantle Pakistan. Trying to frame Modi as a new Indira Gandhi or “Lord Shiva” is part of political theatre, but it risks setting unrealistic expectations.

Q: How dangerous is India’s water rhetoric against Pakistan?

Jaffrelot: Extremely dangerous. Talk of stopping river water to Pakistan, especially from leaders, is irresponsible. It ignores basic hydrology. You can’t block rivers without flooding Indian plains. Moreover, India doing this would set a precedent for China to do the same with the Brahmaputra. Water wars would escalate tensions to catastrophic levels.

Q: Has the “normalisation” project in Kashmir failed?

Jaffrelot: Yes. The removal of Article 370 and converting J&K into a Union Territory was supposed to bring peace and development. But repression, de-Kashmirisation of the bureaucracy, army occupation, media control, and disempowerment have bred resentment.

The BJP believed removing autonomy would end separatism. But if it hasn’t worked, a policy rethink is essential. Restoring statehood at the very least is key. Otherwise, the alienation will deepen.

Q: How does the caste census factor into all of this?

Jaffrelot: The caste census announcement right after Pehalgam suggests Bihar elections were a common denominator. For the BJP, power is the ultimate goal, and each election must be won.

But if conducted sincerely, the caste census could shift the political narrative—just like Mandal did. It would expose the lack of representation of non-dominant OBCs and SCs in power structures. This would challenge the BJP’s hold on OBC votes and create space for new caste-based coalitions.

Q: What’s the future of the Modi–RSS relationship?

Jaffrelot: It’s a black box. Modi has centralized power and minimized RSS influence. Unless he exits the scene or loses badly, the RSS won’t regain leverage. The next BJP leader’s alignment with the RSS will determine whether Nagpur can become a kingmaker again.

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