Battle for Bastar Part 3: Blitzkrieg in the ‘forbidden hills’

On the sultry morning of May 21, a single bullet fired from atop a hillock pierced through the heart of a trooper leading the team of the District Reserve Guards (DRG) of the Chhattisgarh police on a major security operation on the eastern fringe of Abujhmadh region of Narayanpur.

For decades, Madh has been a range of forbidden hills in central Bastar region, dotted with small hamlets of the tribal community of Abujhmadias. It’s also been a strong citadel of the Maoists.

The DRG fighter died in action, but after two full days of unsuccessful hunt in the interiors of the Boter village forests on the trijunction of Dantewada, Bijapur, and Narayanpur districts — which forms a part of these un-surveyed densely forested hills, 4,000 square km in size — the beans had been accidentally spilled, perhaps by a panic-stricken sentry of the banned outfit’s topmost cadre.

From a security perspective, Bastar remains the hardest of all the defined LWE regions to clear. As recently as in 2013, in a 45-day multi-state joint operation, the forces had tiptoed into the Abujhmadh area for the first time, and discovered many small hamlets of a tribe cut off from the rest of the world.

In the profuse exchange of fire that lasted five hours, the security forces neutralised the “target” they were looking for. Basavaraju, aka Nambala Keshava Rao, the 74-year-old general secretary (head) of the banned CPI(Maoists), lay dead along with 26 cadres from his protection team — the Maoists said in their press release that 27 cadres had died apart from Basavaraju that morning — on a table-top perch in the midst of a hillock, part of the Abujhmadh hills and their hideout.

Five or six more members of Basavaraju’s protection team from the banned outfit’s Company 6 managed to flee carrying the body of one of their cadres that morning, security officials say.

A chance encounter

“We had virtually given up on the operation,” said Hari Shankar Prasad Dhruw, 31, dressed in his olive fatigues, narrating to The Federal on a recent afternoon in his camp about the arduous three-day operation. His company, christened “Eagles”, was among those in the lead. “Had Basavaraju’s sentry not opened fire on us, we would not have been able to locate them because of the low visibility in that hilly tract.”

That, he says, was a chance encounter, after they decided to comb a portion of the marked area that they had left out to search on the previous two days.

It was the last fatal battle for the military strategist, Basavaraju, a BTech graduate originally from Srikakulam district of Andhra Pradesh, signalling a watershed moment in the history of Naxalism. In the past, he had escaped, some reports say, in a close shave with police on two occasions.

That this was the first time a top-ranking leader of the Maoists got killed in action wasn’t merely an indication of the reversal of the fortunes in the battle for Bastar. From a security perspective, Bastar remains the hardest of all the defined left-wing extremism (LWE) regions to clear. As recently as in 2013, in a 45-day multi-state joint operation, the forces had tiptoed into the Abujhmadh area for the first time, and discovered many small hamlets of a tribe cut off from the rest of the world.

Therefore, this operation was also a pointer to the fact that the security forces now get reliable and pin-pointed intelligence of the Maoist cadres’ movement and their hideouts in the vast stretches of the un-surveyed hills where the State or its security forces had, until barely five years ago, little or no presence.

Otherwise, in a vast area like Abujhmadh, if not for the quality real-time intelligence, how do you trace the whereabouts of the armed guerillas who move constantly, enjoy the terrain advantage, and know the escape routes?

Also read: Who is Basavaraju, the top Maoist commander killed in Bastar encounter?

To add to it, the surrendered Maoists, the former Special Police Officers (SPOs), and the locally recruited personnel are better trained in the guerilla tactics today than they were a decade ago, pre-empting the tactics of the rebels and taking them out during the encounters by encircling and squeezing them.

A maze of telephone intercepts, drone footages, local intelligence, and vital information from the surrendered Naxal cadres forms the backbone of the pre-op analysis at the highest level, said one top intelligence official, speaking to The Federal on the condition of anonymity.

An arduous operation in trying conditions

This was not the first time they had combed this part of the hills, Dhruw said. In the past six months, security forces had conducted several operations. “We got lucky this time.”

Dhruw said they started on the foot-patrol, sanitizing the vast area, one square kilometre at a time, on a hot and humid May 19. The temperature was around 41 degrees Celsius. Teams from Dantewada and Bijapur districts had begun circling in from the south and south west of the hills. The companies of the DRG, Bastar Fighters, and central paramilitary forces from Narayanpur entered the hills from the eastern fringes further south of the tehsil place of Orchha.

“For two days, a group of troopers stayed the ground they had already cleared, while the others went further deep, climbing the many ridges. Mosquitoes, sloth bears, and honeybees kept us company. Abujhmadh is a terrain full of rivers, rivulets, undulating hills, ridges, and dense forests. You won’t know even if someone’s hiding within 50 metres” — Hari Shankar Prasad Dhruw, security personnel

“We had our first skirmish on the first afternoon at the foothills,” recalled Dhruw, a tribal himself. There were perhaps no casualties in that firing, he said. Then, a lull on May 20, when heavy rain posed a challenge to their movement. “We got drenched.” For two days, he said, a group of troopers stayed the ground they had already cleared, while the others went further deep, climbing the many ridges.

“Mosquitoes, sloth bears, and honeybees kept us company,” he joked. Madh is a terrain full of rivers, rivulets, undulating hills, ridges, and dense forests, he explained. “Pata hi nahi chalta aapke pachas meter par koi chupa hua hai (you won’t know even if someone’s hiding within 50 metres of you).”

Unlike in the past, the recent operations are highly coordinated and sophisticated and the troops usually skirt the hamlets and villages of the local tribals tucked in the hills. “Nights, we walk; daytime we rest.” Lugging along on their backs, along with the weapons, were loads of food and medicine supplies.

As the three-day operation ended, the forces had neutralised one of the most wanted Maoist leaders — Basavaraju — carrying a prize of Rs 1.5 crore, announced by the National Investigation Agency (NIA).

As media reports said, Nambala Keshava Rao — who went by the nom de guerre of Basavaraju or Gaganna — was originally from Srikakulam district in today’s Andhra Pradesh and finished his Bachelors in Technology from the regional college of engineering (now an NIT) in Warangal.

A member from a well-to-do Brahmin family, he entered radical politics after joining the Radical Students Union (RSU) during his college days and went to jail after a campus clash with the students’ wing of the RSS led to the death of a student. That was in 1979.

He jumped bail in 1980 and had gone underground since. Officials say he led the tribal and peasant movements on the Andhra-Odisha border in his early phase, before picking up arms under the ambit of the erstwhile People’s War Group (PWG) soon.

The techie rose through the ranks of the CPI (Maoists) over the past two decades, succeeding the first general secretary of the CPI (Maoists) Muppala Lakshamana Rao, having led many military actions, including the daring loot of the Koraput district police armoury in February 2004.

After his taking over as the head of the Central Military Commission and then as general secretary, the rebels increased their offensive in Chhattisgarh. Surrendered Maoists say a tall and sturdy Basavaraju had an imposing personality with a deep voice. He would carry a 9mm pistol, an AK-47, and communication devices. Basavaraju was a man of action, they say.

Also read: How Karregutta ops became the beginning of the end of Maoist leader Basava Raju

Karregutta Hills, the last refuge

More difficult, however, was the operation in the Karregutta Hills (KGH) in Bijapur from April 21 to May 11, with about 10,000 security personnel culled in from different districts and from state and paramilitary forces entering into what was an unexplored and unfamiliar terrain nearly 60 km long and 20 km wide running north to south on the tip of the Chhattisgarh-Telangana border.

These are mountain ranges, with four layers, the highest peaks being 800 metres, enveloped in tall trees and dense undergrowth, making visibility and the movement of troops an enduring challenge.

Along with Abujhmadh in Narayanpur, the KGH in Bijapur are the last major refuge for the armed cadres of the banned CPI (Maoists). Given the inhospitable terrain and the difficulty for security forces in making permanent bases, these areas provide easy hideouts.

Even for the Maoist top cadres, the two hill ranges provide a difficult choice for a long-term hiding since they, too, must come out for supplies, food and information.

“It took us months to prepare and anticipate what we were to face,” Bijapur Superintendent of Police Jitendra Yadav told The Federal during an interview. “It took us a month before we set out to finally do it,” he said.

Not impregnable anymore

Galgan, a village about 4 km east of the hills on the Modakpal-Pujarikanker road, became the forward operational base (FOB), ferrying ration, equipment, and other supplies to the teams of security personnel, who would go in and come out in periods, and as a helicopter landing base to evacuate the injured personnel.

Bijapur itself was where the 24/7 war room had been set up to oversee the operations, he says.

Before this operation, the security forces had never ventured into the hills, dotted with natural tunnels and huge caves. The Maoists, Yadav said, were perhaps surprised by the operation, the import being that no place across Bastar, however difficult or impregnable, was safe anymore for the rebels.

The KGH is where the People’s Liberation Guerilla Army (PLGA) of the Maoists has a strong presence, according to security officials. Most of their well-trained military companies from within the Battalion One usually use this as rest and dispersal ground, as also as a training turf. Yadav said they also discovered the arms-manufacturing facilities in the KGH.

Also read: Govt crackdown leaves Indian Maoist movement on brink of collapse

The entire southern stretch — the east-west axis of Dornapal-Jagargunda-Basaguda-Awapalli, enveloping parts of Sukma, Dantewada, and Bijapur districts — are still sensitive and could be called strongholds of the Maoist movement. You see a growing number of security camps in these plains now, making the movement of the rebels reasonably restricted and tough.

How forces have been moving

Inspector General of Police (Bastar range) Sundarraj Pattilingam said the forces have been moving from the north-south axis of Jagdalpur to Konka westward, clearing the areas, holding them, and squeezing the long stretches to narrow the areas of influence and domination of the Maoists. It took them close to 15 years to reach this stage.

The Modakpal-Awapalli stretch (north to south on the map), where the CRPF has suffered a lot of casualties, is replete with small rivers like the Tarperlu, which play a strategic role in the rebels’ flights into the forests.

“Every day, we suffered casualties in the IED blasts. In all, about 18 personnel got injured and had to be evacuated with much difficulty. IEDs are so endemic to the KGH that our personnel found and defused nearly 450 of them in the 21 days they were combing the hills; we estimate that over 600 of the IEDs are still there.” — Tileshwar Yadav, SDPO of Awapalli

“There are routes within these rivers that the Maoists use for their escape,” said the Sub Divisional Police Officer (SDPO) of the crucial Awapalli area, Tileshwar Yadav.

“This also is the key area where the main companies of the Battalion One operate — one led today by a divisional committee member called Barse Deva after another wanted cadre, Madvi Hidma, got recently elevated to the central committee of their party,” he said. “Our forces haven’t had a one on one with them yet.”

The danger of IEDs

And these cadres are experts in IEDs of all types — from the ones controlled by remotes to wire sensors to plain manual explosive, he said.

On almost all days of the KGH operation, the security forces faced the challenge of the IEDs strewn all along. “Every day, we suffered casualties in the IED blasts. In all, about 18 personnel got injured and had to be evacuated with much difficulty,” revealed Yadav. “IEDs are so endemic to the KGH that our personnel found and defused nearly 450 of them in the 21 days they were combing the hills; we estimate that over 600 of the IEDs are still there.”

Even after the operations were over, as many as three villagers died by accidentally stepping on the manual IEDs when they went into the forests at the KGH foothills to collect the tendu leaves in late May. Ditto with Abujhmadh and other sensitive areas. An additional SP of Sukma, Akashrao Giripunje, died and two police officials were injured in an IED blast on June 9 on the Konta-Errabore road on the Chhattisgarh-Andhra border.

As a CRPF commander at Galgan admitted, asking not be named, “Unless you are really careful and can spot signs of the IEDs planted there as a booby trap, it is difficult to come out alive.”

Read the other stories in the Battle for Bastar series here:

Part 1: How Maoist citadel was breached

Part 2: How tide was turned with multi-pronged strategy

Part 4, coming soon: What next for the Maoists?