From Ashish Joshi to Aparna Kurup: How a riot provision is being used to police speech

Two speech-related FIRs in different cities have converged on the same unlikely criminal provision. In Delhi, former civil servant Ashish Joshi was taken by plainclothes police officers for about nine hours of questioning on September 2 over an FIR under Section 192 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS). Police supplied him a copy only on September 7, after he approached a court.

In Kochi, Keralam, the Cyber Crime Police registered an FIR on September 7 against BIG TV journalist Aparna Kurup over remarks made during a televised debate about Sunni cleric Kanthapuram AP Aboobacker Musliyar’s views on women appearing in public with unrelated men. Kurup, who had already complained of death threats, doxxing and sustained cyber abuse after the programme, was booked under Section 192 along with several other provisions.

The cases concern very different words and settings. Their common charge invites a precise question: when does contentious speech become a provocation intended or likely to cause rioting?

On the facts made public so far, both FIRs appear to use Section 192 as a broad public-order label. The provision is considerably narrower. A prosecution must prove an illegal act, a malignant or wanton state of mind, provocation directed at a person and an intention or knowledge that the provocation is likely to cause a riot. Offence, anger, communal sensitivity and even a general apprehension of disorder do not supply those elements by themselves.

What the two FIRs are about

Joshi said the FIR was based on his August 28 post on X (Formerly Twitter) calling for a fresh election in West Bengal and saying Chief Election Commissioner (CEC) Gyanesh Kumar could not escape a “Nuremberg-style trial” over developments connected with the Special Intensive Revision (SIR) of electoral rolls.

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Joshi said, however, that the police questioning concentrated on a different post. In that post, he claimed there had been a “massive showdown” between Union Home Minister Amit Shah and Home secretary Govind Mohan over a police crackdown on youth protesters in Delhi. X later withheld the post in India in response to a legal demand.

The “Nuremberg-style” formulation is severe and can reasonably be criticised for invoking the prosecution of Nazi leaders in relation to an election official. An FIR under Section 192 must still identify the illegal act, the person allegedly provoked and the facts suggesting that Joshi intended or knew the provocation was likely to cause a riot.

Kurup’s case arose from a debate about Kanthapuram’s remarks that women should not share public platforms with men outside their families and should avoid such spaces. Kurup referred to people who considered it permissible under Quranic teachings for men to consume cannabis, be arrested in an MDMA case or engage in sexual misconduct. Police alleged that the remarks deliberately hurt Muslim religious sentiments and could lead to a breach of peace or communal disturbance.

Also read: Keralam journalist Aparna Kurup booked for allegedly hurting religious sentiments

BIG TV and Kurup issued an unconditional apology on September 1, saying some remarks should have been avoided and expressing regret for hurt caused. Such an apology does not by itself establish the intention or knowledge required by a criminal offence.

The FIR reportedly also cites Sections 299, 302 and 353(2), concerning religious feelings and certain statements promoting enmity, and Section 120(o) of the state police law. The FIR’s concluding part refers to Section 351(1), which concerns criminal intimidation.

Because those charges have separate ingredients, Kurup’s words may invite strong editorial, theological and public criticism while the riot element in Section 192 must still be proved independently.

A low sentence with a wide procedural reach

The text of Section 192 is almost identical to Section 153 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC), which it replaced. It applies when a person, “malignantly, or wantonly”, does something illegal that provokes another person, intending or knowing that the provocation is likely to cause rioting.

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If a riot follows, the maximum sentence is one year. If none occurs, the maximum is six months. Yet the official schedule to the Criminal Procedure Code (CrPC) classifies both branches as cognisable and bailable.

“Cognisable” means the police can register and investigate without first obtaining a magistrate’s order, although arrest safeguards remain. It gives police an immediate entry into a speech case, with questioning and litigation beginning before a court tests whether the words had any credible relationship with a riot.

Rioting has a specific meaning under the BNS: force or violence by an unlawful assembly, ordinarily at least five people sharing a listed unlawful object. Section 192 provides a lesser punishment when no riot occurs, but still requires intention or knowledge of a provocation likely to produce that defined offence. A loose prediction of “breach of peace” cannot substitute for that inquiry.

Courts have already drawn the line

Because Section 192 reproduces the old IPC provision, judgments on Section 153 remain instructive. In the Johnson VU v State of Kerala (2024), the Kerala High Court identified three essentials: an illegal act, malignant or wanton conduct, and an intention or knowledge that the provocation will cause rioting.

The court said “malignantly” denotes an intensified desire to harm, while “wantonly” refers to deliberate harm without acceptable reason. It quashed the WhatsApp-post case before it because the ingredients were absent, while confirming that the provocation must still be likely to cause rioting even if no riot occurs.

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A fresh Madras High Court judgment illustrates the distinction between false speech and riot provocation. In Vinoth Suriya Kumar v State, decided on August 28, a social media user had falsely connected a Tamil Nadu minister to the registration of Palani temple land and was arrested under Sections 192 and 353.

The court called the posts reckless, required an affidavit acknowledging the error, and quashed the FIR because they were not aimed at provoking a riot and produced no reasonable apprehension of one. Falsity and reputational harm could not fill the missing elements of a public-order offence.

The Telangana High Court reached a similar result in Nalla Balu v State of Telangana in September 2025. It quashed three FIRs over political posts, finding that harsh language without an intention or knowledge of provoking a riot could not attract Section 192.

The court also told police to check whether the ingredients of a cognisable speech offence were prima facie present, avoid mechanical FIRs over harsh political speech and obtain a prosecutor’s opinion in sensitive cases. On February 2, the Supreme Court declined to interfere with the judgment or guidelines. Its short order left the Telangana directions intact without framing them as a code expressly binding every police force.

The national constitutional rule is older and more settled. In Shreya Singhal v Union of India (2015), the Supreme Court separated discussion and advocacy from incitement. In Imran Pratapgarhi v State of Gujarat (2025), it added that words must be judged by the standards of reasonable, firm and courageous people, rather than those who perceive danger in every hostile opinion.

Reaction to speech cannot replace the speaker’s intent

Kurup’s experience brings a troubling inversion. She reported threats that allegedly circulated her address and family photographs, some referring to the 2010 attack on professor TJ Joseph. The subsequent FIR treats possible communal disturbance as a consequence of her remarks.

Threatening reactions can require investigation in their own right. They do not automatically prove that the original speaker intended a riot or knew one was likely. Allowing the most aggressive audience response to determine criminality would reward intimidation and give hostile listeners control over the boundaries of public debate.

The same need for a causal account applies to Joshi. His call for a trial may be hyperbolic, accusatory and legally ill-informed, but police must connect it to likely collective violence. The publicly reported basis has not disclosed that connection. The difference between the post cited in the FIR and the one reportedly emphasised in questioning adds to the need for a clear account.

Section 192 has a legitimate field of operation. A person who deliberately commits an illegal act to provoke a group into collective violence can be prosecuted before the anticipated riot. Diluting “illegal”, “malignantly or wantonly”, “provocation” and “rioting”, however, turns a targeted offence into a convenient attachment for contentious expression.

The section has appeared across a broad range of speech. It has been used against a Bengaluru protester holding placards for Umar Khalid and Sharjeel Imam and against TG Mohandas over a video speaking of shooting protesters. The distance between a slogan, political criticism and language contemplating violence shows why the ingredients must be recorded rather than assumed.

Courts may eventually examine the complete FIRs and evidence. The threshold question arises earlier. Before activating a cognisable riot offence, investigators should state the illegal act, the audience allegedly provoked, the contemplated riot and the facts supporting intent or knowledge. Otherwise, Section 192 supplies police power first and leaves citizens to establish its limiting conditions after the process has begun.